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Exclusionary Zoning - An Unfair Target
WERNER Z. HIRSCH*
The problem of exclusionary zoning is a serious one; the number
of jurisdictions that have enacted exclusionary ordinances to date
is large and the number of cases filed in both federal and state
courts involving such ordinances is also increasing. To effectively
deal with the problem of exclusionary zoning, the rationale for
such exclusionary enactments must be analyzed. This analysis
reveals that the true targets for complaint are the underlying
causes for these exclusionary enactments, not the zoning ordinances
themselves.
In order to better understand these underlying stimuli, an
historical background of zoning and exclusionary zoning will be
presented. Against this foundation, inquiry will be made into the
question of whether the primary stimulus of exclusionary zoning is
the strong reliance of local governments on property taxation to
finance people-oriented services. The judiciary's view and policy
implications of local property taxation issues will be discussed.
Finally, alternatives to local property taxation for the purpose of
eliminating the source of exclusionary zoning will be proposed.
* B.S. University of California (1947); Ph.D. University of California
(1949); Director: Institute Government and Public Affairs. Mr. Hirsch is
Professor of Economics at University of California at Los Angeles.
The impetus for government to control the use of land came
relatively late in this country. This was due partly to strong notions
of the sanctity of private property rights and partly to a great
abundance of land which made land use conflicts less severe than
in more crowded European nations. Predictably, the first attempts
to regulate land use were made in the cities, and ordinances regu-
lating building height and land use were passed in Boston and Los
Angeles around 1909. More complex efforts to divide cities into
districts, which permitted some uses and excluded others, were
made in the following decade, and this technique of "zoning" was
given the Supreme Court's approval in 1926.' At about the same
time, the Commerce Department produced a Standard Zoning
Enabling Act 2 , which was adopted wholeheartedly by the states.
Its key feature was complete delegation of zoning power to local
jurisdictions. Given the limited function of zoning and the large
distances between cities at the time, land use decisions made in one
locality had little effect upon others. Thus, this large-scale delega-
tion of power made a good deal of sense, for it gave control to those
most familiar with and most affected by land use decisions.
The decades following the Standard Act saw a continuing refine-
ment of zoning techniques designed to enable planners and local
officials to better achieve the zoning goals of segregating inconsis-
tent uses, preventing congestion and providing for the economical
distribution of public services. Soon, however, zoning began to be
used as a technique to achieve other more controversial goals. At
quite an early stage it was realized that zoning could separate
different racial and economic groups as well as different land uses.3
As the suburban explosion of the 1950's began to reach significant
proportions, rural townspeople realized that zoning could be used
to slow the influx into their jurisdictions. Large-lot zoning, mini-
mum floor space requirements and trailer park bans proliferated.
The late 1960's and early 1970's saw an awakening of environmental
awareness, and zoning became a weapon in the battle to preserve
open spaces and prevent what were perceived as unaesthetic
housing tract developments. Recent movements to curb or halt
1. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. The Standard Zoning Enabling Act (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1926),
reprinted in 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 26.01 (1968), C.
BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 612 (1968) and in 3 A. RATHKOPF, THE
LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 100 (3d ed. 1960).
3. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), which invalidated an
ordinance that had zoned some areas for black occupancy and others for
white occupancy.
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population growth in many suburban communities combine the
two objectives of diverting suburban expansion away from the
enacting community and preserving the community's aesthetic
charm as a "small town" environment. The new land use control
techniques which developed to achieve these objectives retain many
traditional zoning methods, but often expand the old concepts of the
purposes of land use regulations. Building moratoriums, popula-
tion caps, open space zoning ordinances, "holding zones" and
phased growth ordinances have sprung up in many places where
population growth threatens.
If one were to attempt a broad generalization about the historical
development of the functions of zoning, one might say that what
began as a tool to solve largely local problems of incompatible land
uses and congestion can, and perhaps in part already has, become
a means of solving much larger regional problems of population
distribution and environmental preservation. This development
has paralleled a large demographic shift of population first from
rural areas to central cities and later from central cities to suburbs.
II.
There are various incentives which lead low income households
to follow those of higher income into the suburbs. Among the
most important stimuli is the fiscal advantage which can be
obtained from such a move. Such an advantage accrues whenever
local government relies on a revenue source that is not a perfect
benefit tax, e.g., a property tax. Given the high per capita property
value of many suburbs, public expenditures can be supported with
a relatively low ad valorem tax rate. 4 Thus, the owner of a struc-
4. For example, a central city might have a property value per house-
hold of $20,000, and an actual property tax rate of 5% to raise $1,000 per
household. A suburban jurisdiction might typically have a higher property
value per household, an example of $50,000, and so an actual tax rate of 3%
would raise $1,500. A $20,000 structure located in the suburb would gen-
erate only $600 in tax revenues, while the occupant could receive the bene-
fits of very high quality public services. Thus, there are strong incentives
generated by the property tax for the location of low value structures out-
side the central city. Further, the additional household would impose
costs on the suburban community of $1,500 while paying only $600. The
$900 difference must be assumed by other taxpayers. Consequently, there
are important incentives for the initial suburban residents to attempt to
exclude.
ture with low value could pay very little in taxes while receiving
the benefits of high quality services. At the same time, this
individual would probably impose on the local government costs of
about the same magnitude as other members of the community. 5
Given that each additional service recipient imposes costs on the
local government, how will these additional costs be paid for?
Where all residents of a community occcupy similar dwellings, a
tax based on the value of the dwelling will yield approximately the
same revenue from each household. Some variation in the tax
liability will result as house value varies, but these variations will
be proportionate to benefits received from the community, since
those occupying larger houses will tend to have larger families.
Thus, where potential entrants have about the same income and
tastes as present residents, the property tax is a fairly effective
revenue raising instrument.
Where prospective entrants intend to utilize relatively small
amounts of housing, it becomes unlikely that their property tax
payment will be sufficient to cover the cost of locally provided
public services. These costs would then have to be assumed by the
other taxpayers in the community. For this reason, the residents
of a high income jurisdiction will attempt to zone out low income
households, or, more specifically, low value residences. 6 Suburbs
now are attempting to exclude more than before; this may be
because decentralization of employment is a fairly recent phenom-
enon, or because fiscal advantages have only recently become more
pronounced, or some combination of these two factors.
7
5. There has been empirical evidence that no major economies of scale
exist with regard to a number of services. W. HIRscH, THE ECONOMICS OF
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1970).
6. Increasing marginal cost assures that charging marginal cost to
each resident will cause the community to cover total cost.
7. Traditionally, employment opportunities were largely confined to
the Central Business District (CBD). A transport center such as a harbor
or a freight yard motivated location of manufacturing close to this facility;
movement of low value per ton goods away from rail or water centers was
quite costly. Communication within the city was also costly, and as a
result banking, 'advertising, government and other support industries tended
to locate near the transport hub. Given centralized employment, all
households found it desirable to reside near the town's center. Conse-
qently, prices of land close to employment centers were bid up. With
higher prices near the CBD, high income households who wished to consume
large quantities of land found it efficient to incur greater commuting costs
in order to save on housing. Low income households, on the other hand,
typically found that the possible savings in housing expenditure from
locating at a distance from place of employment would not outweigh
increased transport costs, given the small amounts of land that they could
afford.
With the advent of inexpensive communication, e.g., the telephone, and
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The question of whether property tax incentives are sufficient to
induce movement between jurisdictions has been investigated.
Bradford and Kelegian provide econometric evidence that fiscal
advantages are significant in explaining interjurisdictional mobil-
ity.8 Aronson and Schwartz tested their model of fiscally-induced
movement to find that 69% of migration in the Fifties and 89% in
the Sixties brought fiscal advantages to the mover.9 The basis for
such models is that communities with relatively high tax bases can
offer either lower ad valorem tax rates to provide a given level of
public service, or better public services for a given tax rate, or some
combination of the two. As a result, planning a particular level of
housing consumption could reduce tax payments or increase public
goods consumption, or both, by choosing a community with a very
high average value of property.
Admittedly there are additional motivations for exclusion. Some
jurisdictions, having reached an efficient scale, may wish to limit
their size. However, this may be a secondary problem, since proper
charging for public services would provide signals to possible
the prevalence of truck transport, the costs of non-central location of firms
diminished. Firms could thus reduce land costs to themselves, and in the
long run do likewise for employees, since workers could now reside on less
expensive land without incurring transport costs. In this context, it is seen
that centralized employment in the past has given rise to the current
arrangement of people which involves almost complete segregation of
jurisdictions by income. With decentralization of employment, the homo-
geneity of suburbs has now come under attack. Community size may, of
course, be an independent source of intent to exclude. People may
value the small town atmosphere, or the fact that they know everyone.
Such concerns may be dealt with by constraints on the rate of growth or
by subdivisions which divide the community into several separate entities.
In other cases, the small town atmosphere that apparently is valued may
actually be external benefits from current non-residential land uses. Here
the issue becomes whether the residents have the right to constrain such
land use. If not, the local government might be willing to purchase land
which would otherwise be developed for housing and devote the land to
parks, or simply lease it to non-residential users.
8. Bradford & Kelegian, An Economic Model of Flight to the Suburbs,
81 J. OF POLL EcoN. 566 (1973).
Bradford and Kelegian found that both the presence of the poor in the
central business district and the fiscal burdens imposed on the middle class
were significantly related to the dispersion of the middle and high income
people in a metropolitan area.
9. Aronson & Schwartz, Financing Public Goods and the Distribution
of Population in a System of Local Governments, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 137
(1973).
entrants when the community had exceeeded its optimum popula-
tion. Entrants then would find that they could obtain a more
favorable tax benefit package in smaller communities and would
look elsewhere. Thus, reliance on the property tax is likely, in this
instance, to be a source of the desire to exclude.
Furthermore, an already homogeneous community may wish to
maintain homogeneity in order to assure that new voters will favor
the continuation of present policies. Again, the revenue raising
device is a source of concern; if prospective entrants were con-
fronted with the full cost of services they receive, they would have
little incentive to locate in communities other than those in which
present policies accommodate their own preferences for public
goods.
Finally, exclusionary zoning may be a manifestation of racism-
excluding low income households may be a device intended to keep
out blacks and other minorities. While it is difficult to assess the
extent of this last motivation, the local property tax appears to be a
major transgressor.
III.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Southern Burlington County
v. Township of Mount Laurel' saw that the true reason behind an
exclusionary zoning plan was preservation of the local tax base.
The court struck down the exclusionary zoning measure, while
leaving intact the local property tax system which the court
acknowledged imposed unequal burdens. Reform of the tax sys-
tem was regarded as a task for the legislature." But the inequal-
ities resulting from use of the property tax as a basis for financing
local communities have been succesfully attacked in the court.
Serrano v. Priest12 was a class action for a declaratory judgment
that the California system of financing public schools through local
property taxes violated the state and federal equal protection
clauses. Reversing the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a
cause of action, the California Supreme Court identified education
as a fundamental right and declared that, as described in the com-
plaint, the local property tax system invidiously discriminated
against the poor and that a new method of financing would have to
be found. Lower income communities were deemed to have no
freedom of choice between devoting more resources to education as
10. Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
11. Id. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731.
12. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971).
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opposed to lowering taxes, because the relatively low assessed
valuation in poorer districts meant that even a high rate of taxation
would produce a low overall yield.13 The case was remanded to
the trial court for a final judgment on the merits. The California
court was careful to point out that this reasoning does not apply
to all municipal services, 14 but it is well to note that the Mount
Laurel court found "provision for adequate housing of all categories
of people is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the
general welfare required in all local land use regulation."'15
The reaction to Serrano has been mixed. The New Jersey high
court' 6 has invalidated its state school financing system based on
the local property tax, while the Michigan system has been
upheld.' 7 A number of commentators have questioned whether the
quality of education can be directly related to the amount of money
spent. This was part of the basis of the United States Supreme
Court decision in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,'8 which
found that financing education through the local property tax led
to some inequities but refused to follow Serrano and find a viola-
tion sufficient to offend the federal equal protection clause. The
Court spoke of the deference due to state financial organization.'9
In fact, the Supreme Court has found that protection of the tax
base is an acceptable basis for exercising the local control of
development.
In James v. Valtierra,2 0 the United States Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a California initiative measure requiring
local referenda before approval of federally subsidized low income
housing projects, saying that the procedure ensures that all the
people of a community will have a voice in a decision which may
lead to large expenditures of local government funds for increased
public services and to lower tax revenues.21 In other words, pre-
serving the local tax base is a permissible purpose in planning the
13. Id. at 594, 487 P.2d at 1248, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
14. Id. at 614, 487 P.2d at 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
15. 67 N.J. at 179, 336 A.2d at 727 (emphasis added).
16. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
17. Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973).
18. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
19. Id. at 40-41.
20. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
21. Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
development of a housing plan for a municipality under the federal
Constitution. However, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the
Mount Laurel decision, relying on its state constitution, found this
an impermissible aim.22
IV.
The local property tax, in the absence of some additional con-
straints, provides a number of distortions or inefficiencies. One
efficiency consequence of the local property tax is that it does not
impose full costs for services on individuals. Yet, only when indi-
viduals are confronted by the full cost that they impose on a, local
government can they seek out jurisdictions that meet their service
demands; reasonably homogeneous communities emerge and local
decisions can be reached without encountering major conflicts with
individual preferences. Since the property tax does not impose
full costs on each household, it will, in the absence of exclusionary
zoning, create heterogeneity in communities and a mismatch
between the local public services which individuals prefer and
those which are received. This occurs because the developments
most strongly attracted to high value-low tax rate communities
will be those with high density and low value per household.
A second efficiency consequence of the property tax, were no
exclusion to apply, is that builders will choose a location not
simply on the basis of locational efficiency, but on the basis of
fiscal advantages as well. Thus, resources are used not where they
generate the greatest social value, but where the combination of
output and tax advantage has the greatest value. The normal
assurance that the market allocates resources to the most produc-
tive use is therefore sacrificed by the property tax.
A third efficiency consequence relates to the distortion that
results from taxing only one type of property. Consumers will
substitute consumption goods that are not taxed for those that are.
Houses will tend to be less expensive and smaller under the prop-
erty tax than they would be with a more neutral form of taxation. 23
22. Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 119 N.J. Super. 164, 171, 290 A.2d 465, 469 (L. Div. 1972).
23. Those familiar with Hamilton's work will notice an apparent incon-
sistency between his work and ours, with Hamilton finding no tax distor-
tion with particular zoning constraints in place. The discrepancy between
his results and ours stems from the nature of the zoning constraint postu-
lated. He deals with a minimum property value standard, while we deal
with a minimum lot size requirement. The essential difference is that the
latter constrains more rigidly the number of units that can be placed in a
community. The large-lot zoning case depends upon capitalization or tax
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Turning to distributional concerns, at first impression it appears
that the property tax, in the absence of exclusion, accomplishes a
redistribution from rich to poor. If this is the case, there are
questions as to whether this would be a preferred redistribution
scheme and whether the poor should be given the right to effect
redistribution by locating in higher income jurisdictions. Clearly,
this sort of redistribution, whether justifiable or not, is partial and
very inaccurate; the poorest people, unable to pay moving expenses,
would probably remain in the poor jurisdictions and many of the
richest, living in old, wealthy and established jurisdictions, would
be able to avoid the redistribution.
The problem, however, is not as simple as that. In the last fifty
years, the availability of fiscal advantages in suburban commu-
nities has provided strong incentives to locate expensive properties
in these areas. The attraction of the upper and middle income
household into the suburbs and out of the city has been the source
of the fiscal crisis of today's cities. However, there is no reason
to expect that fiscal crises would not recur. Each generation of
affluent Americans tends to locate in new jurisdictions, leaving the
old suburbs to decay just as the central city did before.24 The result
would be costly movement of households and unnecessarily rapid
depreciation of housing capital. That this will occur is evidenced
by the problems now being experienced by some of the older
suburbs. The point here is that redistribution is limited by suc-
cessive rounds of fiscally induced movement and when redistri-
bution does occur, it occurs only at a cost in terms of reduced
allocative efficiency.
Another consideration relates to the incidence of the property
tax. Normally, it is assumed that the tax is entirely shifted to
eventual occupants, since the supply of housing is, in the long run,
advantages to produce the homogeneity result, whereas homogeneity under
Hamilton's zoning scheme does not require capitalization.
It has been suggested that the minimum lot requirement is equivalent
since efficiency will match large lots with large houses. However, under
a system of lot size constraints there is no reason to expect a stable rela-
tionship between land and non-land factors in the production of housing
services. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local
Governments, 12 URBAN STUDIES 205 (1975).
24. P. MoRRIsoN, THE CURRENT DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT OF NATIONAL
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 5514 at III (1975).
quite competitive.25 However, a supplier of housing would not pass
on the benefits of any unusual tax advantages that his unit pos-
sessed. Even if "balanced" communities could be assured, redistri-
bution is not assured. The rental payment or the sale price of a
structure is determined in a competitive market. Therefore, tax
benefits applying to fairly few properties would not be passed on
to consumers as long as their next best alternative is to buy or rent
downtown, where tax rates are high and services are poor. Where
a community's favorable tax base allows greater per capita expendi-
tures for public services, rent would be bid up by tenants to reflect
these advantages. In short, as long as prices are determined in a
competitive market and the marginal units remain in areas offering
an unfavorable tax benefit package, the occupant would receive
little or no benefit. The consumer gets what he pays for and little
more; the tax advantages accrue to the initial owner, that is,
builders who manage to acquire the rights to "balance" a com-
munity by their action. One needs only to look at who the litigants
are in exclusionary zoning cases to assess the merits of this last
argument.
V.
It has been shown that heavy local reliance on property taxes
can produce inefficiencies, an erratic redistribution of wealth and
a clamor for exclusionary ordinances. The poor are given incen-
tives to "invade" higher income jurisdictions; the rich "act in
self-defense" in seeking to protect the homogeneity of their com-
munities. Failure to allow high income communities to defend
their status has several shortcomings: (1) reduction of choice in the
consumption of public goods; (2) locational inefficiency resulting
from people choosing areas not only for advantageous location but
also for fiscal reasons; and (3) the instability of aging communities.
Moreover, builders of low cost structures are likely to capture much
of the benefit of a fiscal transfer which would exist until an
equilibrium is obtained.
Excluding devices may remedy some of the difficulties raised by
the local property tax, yet they themselves may create both ineffici-
encies and distributional problems. Such devices include large-lot
zoning, annual quotas and entry fees. All three instruments can be
so designed as to counteract some of the inefficiencies associated
25. Heinberg and Oates, The Incidence of Differential Property Taxes
on Urban Housing: A Comment and Some Further Evidence, 23 NAT'L TAX
J. 92 (1970).
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with local property tax financing. An entry fee based on the
capitalized value of the difference between the property tax rev-
enue for a given unit and the lump sum tax which would support
the local government could solve most of the problems without
introducing new ones.
Without special attention, however, exclusionary ordinances
themselves can inhibit efficient resource allocation and reduce the
opportunity of various income groups to locate in a given munici-
pality-a distributional concern. Thus, local exclusionary zoning
is merely a manifestation of a potential evil. The origin and,
therefore, the ultimate transgressor is the local property tax.
What are some of the policy implications? Since the local
property tax provides a major incentive for local exclusionary
zoning, its replacement by other taxes, preferrably lump sum
taxes, might be considered. But replacing local property taxes
by a user charge, for instance, poses serious equity problems. Many
services, such as education, may produce substantial inter-jurisdic-
tional external effects, or may be regarded to be essential to the
equality of opportunity to which our society commits itself. How-
ever, the equity problem of lump sum taxes might be mitigated if
all households were assured some minimum income. This could
be done with the aid of a negative income tax-a means of main-
taining the personal income of citizens distinguished by no charac-
teristic other than their poverty. A partial step toward this
approach was taken in 1964 when a minimum standard deduction
was introduced with the aim of exempting from the federal in-
come tax the minimum income necessary to lift a family out of
poverty. TO benefit from this tax relief, however, it is necessary
to receive an adjusted gross income at least as large as the poverty
guideline.
Milton Friedman in 1962 proposed a negative income tax.
26
Under his scheme, citizens would continue to compute taxable
personal income in the present manner. When taxable income was
positive, a positive tax liability would be incurred. However, if
taxable income were negative-personal exemptions and deductions
exceed adjusted gross income-then a negative tax liability would
be incurred on that base and a transfer payment equal to that
26. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
negative tax liability would be received. In this manner every
household could be assured a minimum adjusted gross income of
hypothetically four, five or six thousand dollars a year. For each
dollar of earnings the transfer is reduced, for instance, by 50% so
as not to reduce a person's ability and, therefore, incentive to
earn more.
27
A proposal similar to Friedman's was made by James Tobin.2 8
It called for the federal government to provide family allowances
entitling every man, woman and child to a $400.00 transfer payment
each year. Thus, a family of four would be guaranteed a $1,600
minimum cash flow. A 33 /a marginal tax rate is applied to each
dollar of cash receipts from all sources other than the allowance.
Putting a floor below every taxpayer's income through a nega-
tive income tax has proved administratively and otherwise feasible,
based on a large scale experiment in New Jersey. 29 Whether it
would work in the long run on a nation-wide scale remains to be
seen. Likewise, it is not clear how difficult and expensive it would
be to use a negative income tax both to supplement the wages of
low wage earners and to support families with no income at all.
Such major tax revisions are neither demanded nor likely to
come about merely for the sake of dealing with local exclusionary
zoning. However, there are many other reasons why such changes
might evolve; should they provide lower income floors than those
discussed above, a partial substitution of lump sum taxes for
property taxes could be contemplated. Even in the absence of a
negative income tax, local governments could replace the property
tax with a user charge to finance such services as refuse collection,
street cleaning, street repair and possibly even parks and recreation.
Alternatively, state and federal governments could allow a per-
centage of a person's payment to local government to be credited
against tax liabilities, with this percentage varying inversely with
income. As a result, the effective price of local public services for
low-income households would be reduced. Either scheme would
have the advantage of permitting the individual to have a high
degree of autonomy with regard to the choice of local public
services, including schools.
In the last analysis, it is taxes which bend the twig and mold the
shape of our economic tree in general and of suburban growth in
27. The two major policy decisions about a negative income tax scheme
relate to the guarantee level and tax rate at which other income is taxed
and earnings thereby reduced.
28. J. TOBIN, ON IMPROVING T=E EcoNoMIc STATUS OF THE NEcRo (1965).
29. WORK INCENTIVES AND INCOME GuARANTs (J. Pechman & P. Tim-
pane eds. 1975).
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particular. Rules about exclusionary zoning can fertilize or freeze,
stimulating or retarding suburban growth and homogeneity of
communities; but it is the tax system by which government, albeit
at times inadvertently, decides the direction pursued by suburban
communities. No tax is more potent in this respect than the local
property tax. If the nation decides that the tendency of wealthy
suburbs to build solid walls around themselves is to be considered a
sordid, intolerable act, neither statutory nor common law regulating
exclusionary zoning are likely to combat the tendency as effec-
tively as tax policy can.
S13
